This paper analyses legislative behavior in foreign policy issues in six Latin-American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. The following paper offers an empirical contribution to understand legislative voting in international affairs. The hypothesis of the specificity of foreign policy influencing a unified legislative behavior, contrasted with a highly polarized domestic arena, is tested. To develop this test we estimate Latina-American legislator’s ideal points in foreign policy issues, comparing ours results with studies that examine legislative behavior in domestic issues. The conclusions suggest similarity between legislative behaviors in both arenas, indicating as main explanatory factors of legislative voting in foreign policy political party’s ideology and the legislative coalition of legislator’s political party.
Keywords:
Legislative Behavior, Foreign Policy, Roll Call Votes, Ideal Points, Latin America
Author Biographies
Pedro Feliú Ribeiro, Universidad de São Paulo
Centro de Estudios de las Negociaciones Internacionales/USP
Amâncio Jorge de Oliveira, Universidad de São Paulo
Centro de Estudios de las Negociaciones Internacionales/USP, Brasil.
Feliú Ribeiro, P., & de Oliveira, A. J. (2019). Political Parties and Foreign Policy in Latin America. Estudios Internacionales, 51(193), 65–104. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.2019.54138
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